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Abstract 
Are inclusive welfare states compatible with free movement of people? For long the nexus between 
immigration and the welfare state has been perceived as fragile or even unsustainable. In this paper, 
we examine the fiscal impact of European Union (EU) immigration on the universalistic, tax-
financed welfare state of Denmark, on the argument that it constitutes a crucial case within an 
exceptional system for examining the unsustainability thesis. On the basis of a unique dataset of 
administrative data, consisting of repeated cross sections of 100% of the population of EU citizens 
residing in Denmark on the December 31st of each year between 2002 and 2013, we analyse EU 
citizens’ contribution to and consumption of welfare benefits, in order to research the evolution of 
net fiscal contribution to the welfare state over a long time span. We find that EU immigrants made 
a significant positive net contribution to the Danish welfare state. Not only have EU citizens paid 
their way through the welfare system. They have also made a considerable contribution to its fiscal 
sustainability.  
Key words: Welfare state, free movement of persons, European Union, fiscal impact, sustainability 
 
Introduction 
Are inclusive welfare states compatible with free movement of people? For long, the nexus between 
immigration and the welfare state has been perceived as fragile or even unsustainable. But what is 
the de facto fiscal impact of migration inflows on the welfare state?  
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In general, the scholarly debate finds the relationship between free movement of people and the 
welfare state to be a tense, or even unsustainable, one. Milton Friedman is famously cited for the 
claim that open borders are incompatible with the modern welfare state (see Nannestad 2007, 514; 
Ruhs 2015, among others) and in 1986, Freeman concluded that national welfare cannot coexist 
with free movement of labour (Freeman 1986). The argument is that the welfare state relies on a 
profound logic of closure. It requires boundaries because it establishes some form of distributive 
justice, which departs from the logic of a free market. Furthermore, its historical development goes 
hand in hand with the nation-state (Freeman 1986, 52). In the institutional and historical setting of 
the welfare state, migration of labour constitutes the ‘most important and directly relevant’ 
challenge to the welfare state (Freeman 1986, 55) and high welfare standards depends on limiting 
access to benefits (Faist 1995). Ruhs identifies a tradeoff between countries’ openness to admitting 
immigrants and the rights granted to immigrants after admission, including social rights (Ruhs 
2013). The conclusion is that openness comes with a price in the sense that states with more liberal 
immigration policies are more restrictive regarding access to rights. According to Ruhs, the fiscal 
effect of immigration is critically dependent on whether and how migrants’ social rights are 
restricted. Turning specifically to the welfare impact of the free movement rules in the European 
Union (EU), Ruhs suggests that in particular the more inclusive welfare states with flexible labour 
markets and a relative large share of non-contributory benefits are challenged (Ruhs 2015). These 
types of welfare states are more exposed than their European counterparts with more regulated 
labour market and more contributory welfare states are hardly compatible with the free movement 
regime of the EU (Ruhs 2015, 23). 
The literature on ‘welfare magnetism’ has greatly contributed to this debate. The welfare magnet 
hypothesis poses that states with more generous welfare policies attract immigrants with high 
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preference for welfare benefits through two different mechanism (Borjas 1999).1 First, migrants 
who seek to avoid the labour market and income risks move to those countries where welfare 
benefits are more attractive. Second, the safety net in such countries discourages unemployed 
immigrants from seeking employment in other countries, turning temporary work migrants into 
permanent welfare immigrants (Freeman 1986, 57). In particular the Scandinavian welfare states 
rank as the more generous ones in the EU (Nannestad 2007, 517). If welfare magnets attract welfare 
migration as the theory poses, more inclusive and generous welfare policies are not sustainable in 
open economies of free movement. 
However, as noted by Nannestad, open borders and free immigration does not exist in full anywhere 
in the world (Nannestad 2007, 514). Most countries guard their borders, residence rights and/or 
access to their welfare schemes carefully. However, the European Union constitutes a case of 
‘exceptionalism’ in this regard (Ruhs 2015). The Union has for long embarked on a ‘radical 
experiment’ with open borders and access to the welfare states of its members (Geddes and Hadj-
Abdou 2016, 222). The viability of this exceptionalism has been questioned. Public and political 
concerns of welfare states’ sustainability in a Community where Union citizens can move and 
reside freely have been loudly expressed. In particular, it was voiced in relation to the grand EU 
enlargement of 2004, where the 8 Central and Eastern European states (EU8)2 became members 
(Dustmann et al. 2010, 2; Ruist 2014, 21). Concerns that EU immigrants ‘take out more than they 
put in’ have sounded loudly despite the fact that recent studies demonstrate a positive net 
                                                            
1 This effect may not necessarily be limited to unskilled immigrants, since also high-skilled 
immigrants may prefer to live in countries with generous social benefit systems, e.g. because 
economic fluctuations might affect their employment perspectives irrespective of the skill level. 
2 In May 2004, 8 Central and Eastern European States became members of the European Union; the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, hereafter 
termed as EU8. Also Malta and Cyprus became EU members in 2004.  
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contribution of EU citizens and migrants to the welfare state (Dustmann et al. 2010; Dustmann and 
Frattini 2014; Ruist 2014). UK studies based on survey information from the national Labour Force 
Survey have demonstrated positive fiscal consequences of different samples of EU immigrants in 
the UK. Dustmann, Frattini and Halls show that immigrants from EU8 countries that joined the 
European Union in 2004 had a higher net fiscal impact than similar UK citizens (Dustmann et al. 
2010). EU8 immigrants made higher direct and indirect tax contribution as well as they claimed less 
public benefits and services than similar UK citizens. In their 2014 paper, Dustmann and Frattini 
considered the fiscal impact of two different populations; the population of migrants from the 
European Economic Area (EEA)3 in UK between 1995 and 2011 and the immigrants from EU10 
countries and rest of EU countries (called old EU) over the period between 2001 and 2011 
(Dustmann and Frattini 2014).4 Dustmann and Frattini found that EEA migrants contributed 10% 
more than UK citizens, and that immigrants arrived in the 2000’s also made a positive fiscal 
contribution, irrespective of their country of origin. Moreover, a Swedish study based on 
administrative data of approximately 4300 immigrants from old EU countries and 3000 immigrants 
from EU10 countries in Sweden found a larger contribution of migrants from old EU countries than 
Swedish citizens and a similar contribution from migrants from new EU countries to that of Swedes 
(Ruist 2014).5  
Together, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have implied an enormous increase in the 
institutional, economic and social heterogeneity of the Community (Hemerijck 2013, 290; Höpner 
and Schäfer 2012, 436-437), leading to a resurgence of nationalist and welfare chauvinist 
                                                            
3 The EEA consists of the EU member states as well as Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland.   
4 The EU10 countries investigated by Dustmann and Frattini are the EU8 countries plus Bulgaria 
and Romania (Dustmann and Frattini 2014). 
5 The EU10 countries investigated by Ruist are EU8 countries plus Malta and Cyprus (Ruist 2014).  
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sentiments in the old member states (Hjorth 2016; Hemerijck 2013, 320). In April 2013, the 
ministers of interior from Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and the UK sent a joint letter to the 
Council of the European Union stating the view that free movement of persons and access to 
welfare should not be unconditional.6 Together with Denmark, these member states have since 2013 
pushed for the European Commission to propose more restrictive rules on access to cross border 
welfare. Especially concerns about more immediate access to welfare have been expressed, where 
EU immigrants after a short period of residence and/or work would be granted benefits, before 
having earned their way into the system.7 The politicization of the free movement and welfare 
nexus recently came to an extreme with the UK referendum on EU membership. ‘Welfare tourism’ 
was one of the main themes in the political debate and according to Reenan the most important 
reason for the UK exit decision (Reenen 2016). In sum, constitutive EU principles are increasingly 
contested and with the results of the UK referendum, the very fundament of the Union itself is 
indeed shattered. More member states may follow the UK exit path (Reenen 2016).   
Thus theoretically, publicly and politically, the unsustainability thesis is recurrently articulated. It 
contains at least three claims: 1) The EU free movement rules are particularly unsustainable in more 
inclusive and generous welfare states. 2) Due to the increase of socio-economic heterogeneity, the 
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements have a negative effect on welfare state sustainability. 3) 
Immigrants with short-term residence have a more negative effect on welfare state sustainability 
than immigrants with longer term residence as they may benefit from the system before they have 
earned their way into the system.  
                                                            
6 The letter was send 23 April 2013 to the President of the European Council for Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
7 See for example the EU-UK deal made to make the UK remain within the Union, where the UK 
was promised that migrant workers’ could be excluded from certain benefits up to the first four 
years of stay in the UK (European Council conclusions, 19 February 2016, EUCO 1/16, 19-24).   
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Below we examine these assumptions on the welfare state of Denmark in the period 2002-2013. 
Our purpose is to examine the extent to which EU immigrants ‘pay their way in the welfare system’ 
(Dustmann et al. 2010, 2) or make a negative fiscal impact on the public revenues. We argue that 
the Danish universalistic, tax based welfare state is a critical case for examining the relationship 
between open borders and the welfare system. First of all, because the EU rules in their own right 
constitutes a radical experiment for welfare state sustainability (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2016). 
Secondly, in particular the universalistic, tax-based welfare state is argued to be less sustainable in a 
system of open welfare borders because the link between contributions and entitlements is only 
indirect. Denmark is a rather pure example of this welfare state type, with the largest share of non-
contributory benefits among its EU counterparts (Ruhs 2015).  
Our analysis on fiscal impact is carried out on basis of a unique dataset of individual Danish register 
data. We have gained access to a host of public administrative register data, i.e. individual data, for 
the full EU population’s use of welfare benefits and services and their contributions to the public 
revenues, primarily by means of tax-payment 2002-2013. Danish register data are directly reported 
from the Danish tax agency and the municipalities to the Danish national statistical office ‘Statistics 
Denmark’. The fact that data are reported directly by the public authorities, instead of by 
individuals themselves, to the national statistical office makes them highly reliable. Denmark is the 
only country where researches can merge information across sectors and have detailed information 
about benefits received and contributions made on a weekly and monthly basis. The level of 
information is thus remarkable and unique. Thus, on each year, we have computed contributions 
and expenditures from the 100% population of EU citizens residing in Denmark and estimated the 
net fiscal impact for the EU population as a whole and subdivided into different groups. Our 
analysis goes substantially beyond existing studies of EU immigrants’ fiscal impact since it 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the full EU population over a long time span. Furthermore, it 
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should be noted that the 2002-2013 time span involves most important structural changes for the 
European Union which put the welfare sustainability of EU rules at test; three times enlargements 
with a considerable increase in the Union’s socio-economic heterogeneity, financial and economic 
crises as well as important changes in EU rules and rights concerning EU migrants. As most other 
EU member states, Denmark had a transition agreement after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
according to which immigration from the new East European member states were conditioned on 
basis of a work permit. The Danish transition agreement ran from 1 May 2004 - 1 May 2009. Thus 
our time span examines fiscal impact more than four years after the end of the transition agreement.     
Below, we first set out how EU free movement rules and the right to cross border welfare within the 
EU can be regarded as a case of exceptionalism. We then present the characteristics of the Danish 
universalistic, tax-based welfare state as exceptional in its own right, making it more likely to 
confirm the unsustainability thesis. The data of our study are subsequently presented, followed by 
the analysis of the fiscal impact of EU immigration on the universalistic welfare state of Denmark. 
We examine the evolution of EU immigration to Denmark, their fiscal impact in aggregate and on 
average as well as by different components; age, years since migration and country of origin. 
Finally, we examine the likelihood of out-migration of EU citizens in Denmark on the basis of 
individual socio-economic characteristics. 
 
European Union exceptionalism; free movement and cross border welfare 
Compared to other advanced economies, the European Union’s free movement principle for persons 
is exceptional indeed (Ruhs 2015). Since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, free 
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movement of workers has been a constitutive principle of the European Community.8 The right to 
move and reside freely in the Union has subsequently been extended to all EU citizens, meaning all 
persons holding citizenship of one of the member states as well as their family members. This 
implies that member states in general cannot deny residence rights to citizens from their fellow 
member states. Exceptionalism stands even further out by the fact that the free movement right 
applies to all disregarding their worker status. Whereas there is a clear international tendency for 
countries to design their immigration policies so as to attract the highly skilled and well-educated 
(Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009), this is not possible according to the EU rules. Furthermore, EU free 
movement rights also applies to the economically inactive citizens, as long as they do not constitute 
an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social assistance system of the host member state.9  
The unique character of EU free movement stands even further out by the fact that when EU citizen 
use their free movement right, they will also have access to the welfare benefits of the hosting state. 
Not only did the Treaty of Rome adopt free movement for workers, but it also laid down that a 
worker moving from one member state to another has the right to access the social security schemes 
of other member states and to export previously earned social security rights to other member 
states.10 From the very outset, Community rules have contradicted the negative trade-off between 
openness and welfare rights and are instead founded on the idea that effective free movement 
depends on access to welfare across borders. Two Community regulations are means to facilitate 
free movement. Already in 1958, regulation no. 3/58 was adopted by the Council which detailed the 
                                                            
8 Adopted with article 48 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) 
(now article 45 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).  
9 As laid down in article 14 (1) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
10 Adopted with article 51 of the EEC Treaty (now article 48 TFEU). 
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rules for Community workers’ right to cross-border welfare, including which benefits can be 
exported to other member states. The original regulation has later been reformed many times. The 
last major reform took place just before the grand enlargement in 2004 with the adoption of 
regulation 883/200411, where the regulation was reformed into covering not only workers but all 
EU citizens. Regulation 883/2004 grants access to and exportability of a wide range of social 
security benefits, including sickness benefits; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; old-age 
benefits; unemployment benefits and family benefits, but not social assistance. Regulation 
492/201112 (previously regulation 1612/68) further consolidates the rights of migrant workers. This 
regulation covers workers only, but relies on a broad definition hereof, including workers with low 
income and part-time work, as well as it grants the right to maintain workers status if loosing ones 
job. This regulation gives access to all ‘social advantages’ in a hosting member state, including 
social assistance and study grants. But these social advantages cannot be exported. The family 
member of EU citizens and workers are also covered by the right to free movement within the 
Union as well as the right to EU cross border welfare. In addition the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has had an important role in interpreting the scope of EU citizens’ rights to 
the welfare benefits of a hosting member state and to be treated equally with that state’s own 
nationals. Thus in a number of cases, the Court embarked on a more expansive line of 
interpretation, granting Union citizens right of residence and equal treatment as well as access to the 
welfare schemes of a hosting member state, despite being economically inactive.13 In these cases 
the Court developed a distinct vision of Union citizenship as a fundamental status of Member State 
                                                            
11 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems. 
12 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union. 
13 See the Sala (C-85/96), Grzelczyk (C-184/99) and Baumbast (C-413/99) cases among others.  
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nationals (Dougan 2013, 133). The Court stated that had a certain link been established between a 
citizen and a host member state, such link could justify the right to equal treatment to welfare 
benefits.  
However, whereas the Union rules mark a fundamental intervention into the national prerogative to 
define the members of social communities (Cornelissen 1996; Ferrera 2005; Van der Mei 2003), it 
is not without limits. In 2004, the EU adopted the Residence Directive 2004/3814, which further 
details the link between the right to reside and access to welfare benefits for the European migrant. 
The directive’s article 24 sets out that the right to equal treatment is subject to the conditions laid 
down in the Treaty and in secondary law. The residence directive poses a number of conditions on 
the right to reside, of which the need for social protection is the most important one. The need for 
social protection may terminate the right to reside. Whether one qualifies for equal treatment 
depends on ones status as worker and/or the length of residence. In principle, European citizens are 
equal but de facto some European citizens are more equal than others.  
 
Free movement and the universalistic welfare state   
As the other Nordic welfare states, the Danish welfare state is often presented as distinct. It is 
characterised as universalist, largely de-commodified, residence-based, non-contributory and 
relatively generous (Cox 2004; Cornelissen 1997; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ruhs 2015; Korpi and 
Palme 1998; Andersen et al. 2015). Firstly, the Danish welfare state has traditionally been 
characterised as universalist, promoting equality of status among their citizens. In the Scandinavian 
systems of universalism, the needy is not distinguished from the non-needy. Welfare universalism 
benefits the middle class as well as the poor since most benefits are available to all citizens. Social 
                                                            
14 Cf. n 9.  
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policies are not targeted to low income groups as in the residual welfare state as well as they are not 
dependent on labour market participation as in the insurance-based welfare state (Korpi and Palme 
1998). Secondly, according to Esping-Andersen’s famous welfare worlds, a key feature of the 
Nordic model is the high degree of ‘de-commodified’ welfare rights. A de-commodified welfare 
state will thus grant social rights on the basis of citizenship rather than on the basis of market 
performance, i.e. attachment to the labour market (Esping-Andersen 1990). Thirdly, social rights 
are granted on the basis of residence (Cornelissen 1997, 32). A person is entitled to welfare because 
s/he is a citizen or a habitual resident, and not qua individual contributions paid to a specific 
scheme. Fourthly, benefits have traditionally been tax-financed and not based on contributions. Yet, 
tax payment is not a direct requirement to receive a specific social benefit. The Scandinavian 
welfare state has thus traditionally had a much institutionalised principle of equal treatment for the 
members of its welfare communities. Finally, the Scandinavian model has also been characterised 
by relatively generous benefits as well as by extensive welfare services (Lindbom 2001). 
Due to these characteristics, the Danish welfare state has been viewed as ‘unfit’ for Union rules 
where EU citizens have a right to reside and access welfare across borders. According to the 
welfare-magnet hypothesis, its universalistic, relatively de-commodified and generous nature 
should make it particularly attractive to EU immigrants. Furthermore, it’s residence and non-
contributory character, would make it unsustainable in a Community of open welfare borders since 
the organising logic of the system does not ensure that those who benefit also contribute (Scharpf 
2002, 2010). Basically, this type of welfare state is found to be out of tune in its current institutional 
set-up, but also for historical reasons. When the cross border welfare rules were originally designed, 
the six founding members all had insurance-based welfare systems. The Community rules came to 
match this insurance-based logic. Welfare rights were to be granted according to where one works, 
i.e. according to the ‘lex loci laboris’ principle and where one paid into the social security scheme 
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(Cornelissen 1997; Christensen and Malmstedt 2000). This would ensure a balance between 
contribution paid and benefits received. This contrast with the residence-based and non-contributory 
welfare state, which compared to the other member states has been perceived as most exposed to 
the rationales of EU cross-border welfare (Martinsen 2005) and as a distinct welfare state within an 
exceptional system presumed to be unsustainable (Ruhs 2015).  
We now turn to the data presentation and subsequently to the empirical analysis of the fiscal impact 
of EU immigration on this type of welfare state.  
 
Data 
Our research design has common features with the recent literature on EU fiscal impact assessment. 
We adopt a static approach over a long period of time as Dustmann and Frattini to assess the 
evolution of fiscal contribution under very different degrees of EU mobility and accessibility to 
Danish welfare (Dustmann and Frattini 2014). However, we depart from the studies of Dustmann 
and coauthors, by estimating net fiscal impact directly on the basis of individual data (see Ruist 
2014, for similar methods). Danish administrative register data allows us to directly ascribe to each 
EU citizen tax contributions, income transfers and public services covering a very high share of 
total taxes and public expenditures. 
The main contribution of this study is the computation of fiscal impact for 100% population of EU 
citizens in another EU country. Our dataset includes repeated cross sections of 100% of the 
population of EU citizens in Denmark on the December 31st of each year between 2002 and 2013. 
We have been able to get access to the full population of EU citizens, which is seldom granted and 
have to our knowledge not been compiled before in Denmark or beyond. Thus, this unique dataset 
enables us to describe the evolution of EU citizens’ welfare consumption and contribution over a 
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long period of time. Differently from other studies, we do not exclude EU citizens on the basis of 
their length of residence.15 Instead, we estimate fiscal impact for the stock of EU population in 
Denmark, and for the subsamples of shorter term and longer term migrants. This separate analysis 
permits assessing eventual changes over time in the composition of inflow and outflow of EU 
migrants in terms of their contribution to Danish welfare. We study, in addition, the separate fiscal 
impact of migrants from old EU countries and new EU countries, as the migration population from 
central and eastern European countries is growing faster than that from traditional EU countries. 
Finally, we consider also the fiscal contribution of different age groups. 
We construct a dataset for each year by merging a host of administrative registers to such 
populations of EU citizens. These data contain information on each person’s total amount of public 
income transfers and total payment of personal income tax, labour market contribution and tax on 
real property.  The dataset, in addition, contains individual information on the use of health care 
services, criminal charges, daycare, school, secondary and higher education. Finally, we use 
population and migration administrative register information to measure socio-demographic and 
income information as well as the length of residence in Denmark. 
For EU citizens residing 31st December 2002-2013 in Denmark, we compiled their fiscal 
contribution and welfare consumption for each year. The fiscal contributions include income tax, 
property tax, labour market contribution and Value Added Tax (VAT). We have compiled most 
contribution items directly on basis of administrative information at the individual level, with the 
exception of contribution via VAT and levies. VAT is calculated indirectly as 24.5% of EU 
citizens’ disposable income, a high reliable variable which we observe for the whole population. 
                                                            
15 Ruist (2014) estimates the net fiscal impact of EU citizens in Sweden in 2007 with at most 4 
years of residence. Jacobsen, Junge and Skaksen (2011) consider for the same purpose a sample of 
higher educated immigrants in Denmark in 2009 with at most 7 years of residence. 
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We here rely on the Danish authorities standard estimation of contribution via VAT, which is used 
in general across age groups and nationality.16 It may, however, be argued that EU immigrants with 
shorter term residence in a host country save more or send part of their income to relatives in their 
country of origin and therefore do not contribute as much as the national population via VAT. To 
take this into account, we calculated a lower percentage of VAT contribution for the first five years 
of residence, starting with 12.25% VAT contribution during the first year of residence then 
increasing linearly to 24.5% VAT contribution after five years of residence.  
Concerning the public expenditures from EU immigrants in Denmark, we compiled data for 
received cash benefits and benefits in kind. For cash benefits, it is possible to extract data on the 
exact paid out amount by means of Danish register data. The expenditures for all accessible cash 
benefits were compiled at an individual level; unemployment benefits, sick and parental benefits, 
social assistance, integration allowance, social pension, study grant, family benefits, pension 
benefits, early retirement benefit and housing allowance.  
For welfare services, granted as benefits in kind, administrative individual data informs us of the 
consumption hereof, but not of the costs. As the use of welfare services are a relative important part 
of expenditures in the Danish public sector, we compiled data on EU immigrants use hereof at the 
individual level. The data on individual enrollment in daycare and elementary school, allows us to 
identify the individuals use of pre-school and school services. Our data set furthermore allow us to 
identify individuals enrolled in secondary education or higher education programs. In addition, our 
data allow us to identify the individual use of the healthcare sector; consultation at a general 
practioner, dentist as well as hospitalization. Finally, criminal charges against EU immigrants are 
                                                            
16 For Danish authorities’ standard estimation of contribution via VAT and levies, see section 
6.1.3.1 of the Danish tax authorities methods for the calculation of tax revenues (2013) 
http://www.skm.dk/media/138783/provenu_og_metode.pdf. 
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also identifiable in our dataset. For the latter, it should be noted that our estimate of criminality 
costs can be considered as an upper bound, because not all charges end up with convictions. We 
have estimated the costs of welfare services for each year between 2002 and 2013 on basis of 
different sources. The cost per unit estimates of having a child enrolled in day care (i.e. cover 
crèche, family day care, nursery schools and age-integrated institutions) per year rely on the official 
estimates developed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior. The costs per unit estimates 
for being enrolled in elementary school per year rely on the official estimates developed by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior. The cost per secondary education enrolment per year is 
proxied by the rate the state pays to each secondary educational institution per full-time equivalent 
(FTE) (i.e. ‘Taxametertakst’). This data is retrieved from the Ministry for Children, Education and 
Gender Equality. Data on the cost per unit for higher education is proxied by the rate the state pays 
to each higher education institution per FTE (i.e. ‘Taxametertakst’). This data is available from the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Sciences. The yearly total public expenditures to general 
practitioners have been extracted from the financial statement of the Regions. The number of 
consultations per year is retrieved from Statistics Denmark. The cost per unit is calculated by 
dividing total expenditures by the total number of consultations. Data on the total expenditures to 
dentistry is extracted from Statistics Denmark’s data base. The data on consultations are likewise 
found in Statistics Denmark’s data base. The cost per unit is calculated by dividing total 
expenditures by the total number of consultations. Data on the total hospital expenditures and 
number of hospitalizations have been extracted from Statistics Denmark’s public expenditures 
section. The cost per unit estimate is the total expenditures divided by the number of 
hospitalizations (for the same method, see Jacobsen et al. 2011, 23). For the unit cost of criminal 
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charges, we base our estimates on the 2009-estimate in Jacobsen, Junge, and Skaksen (Jacobsen et 
al. 2011, 23). The 2009-estimate is used for the whole period under investigation.17  
Concerning public goods, the ideal would be to be able to calculate the marginal costs for providing 
public goods for each arriving immigrant (see Dustmann and Frattini 2014, 599 for their 
considerations on using marginal versus average cost of public goods). However, no data are 
available for the marginal costs of providing public goods to immigrants. We therefore calculated 
the average costs of public goods, i.e. the ratio of total expenditures for public goods to the total 
population.18 The public goods’ costs covers a long list of items, including costs for legislative and 
administrative institutions, fiscal affairs, external affairs, defence, transport and infrastructure 
maintenance, fire-protection, public order and safety, waste management, environmental protection, 
etc. Many of the items are ‘pure’ public goods in the sense that costs are fixed irrespective of the 
size of the population. The average costs of public goods are therefore likely to overestimate the 
actual costs implied by the EU immigrant. In our analysis below, we therefore generally hold the 
                                                            
17 The online appendix ‘Estimations of welfare service costs in Denmark 2002-2013. A note on data 
collection’ further details the procedures for the estimations. Table 1 in the appendix sets out the 
final estimations used for each services between 2002-2013. 
18 Data on yearly costs of providing public goods are extracted from Statistics Denmark, at 
http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=OFF24&PLanguag
e=0&PXSId=0&wsid=cfsearch ( ID: ‘OFF24’). Items of expenditure include row one through five 
(i.e. ‘General Public Services’, ‘Defense’, ‘Public Order and Security’, ‘Economic Affairs’, 
‘Environmental Protection’ ). Data on the population size are extracted from Statistics Denmark at 
http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=HISB3&PLanguag
e=0&PXSId=0 (ID: ‘HISB3’). The unit cost of yearly public goods provision is calculated by 
dividing the total costs of public goods provision in the given year with the total population size in 
the same year. 
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marginal cost of public goods equal to zero but add a lower bound calculation of average fiscal 
impact where the marginal cost of public goods are equal to average cost (see figure 2.C below).  
For the examination of the net fiscal contribution for different populations of EU citizens in 
Denmark, this is obtained by the difference in means between contributions and expenditures. In 
this way, we can examine the extent to which EU immigrants in Denmark ‘pay their way’ in the 
welfare system (Dustmann et al. 2010, 2) through a long period of time.  
Finally, it should be noted that we have not been able to take into account the contribution of EU 
citizens to corporate tax in Denmark, a feature that can underestimate the total contribution of EU 
citizens to the Danish welfare system.   
 
EU Immigration to Denmark 2002-2013 
We define an EU immigrant as an individual residing in Denmark in the observation year with 
citizenship from a country member of EU on 31st December of the observation year, irrespective of 
the year of arrival or length of migration. In Figure 1, we report graphically the population of EU 
immigrants in Denmark during the years between 2002 and 2013, by different individual 
characteristics. In this period, the number of EU citizens in Denmark has increased considerably 
from 53782 to 159857 people (see Panel A of Figure 1). Over the twelve years timespan, EU 
citizens residing in DK has increased with approximately 146%. However, this important increase 
in EU immigration to Denmark is not equally distributed across different age groups (Figure 1 
Panel B).19 Notably, the group of EU immigrants with age between 25 and 44 has grown at a much 
                                                            
19 Figure A1 in the appendix present the age distribution of EU citizens during the last 5 years of 
our sample, disaggregated by country of origin. As in the Swedish case (Ruist 2014), immigrants 
for new EU countries are more concentrated in the younger half of working ages than immigrants 
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faster pace than the remaining age groups, such that the age distribution of EU immigrants in 
Denmark is increasingly more heavily concentrated in the first half of the working age, with the rest 
of age groups following similar trends. The groups of age retired EU immigrants and children are 
the smallest ones. These are also the groups with potentially most negative impact on fiscal 
contribution of EU citizens. Panel C of Figure 1 plots the evolution of the population of immigrants 
from old EU countries and from new EU countries. This plot clearly shows that in the future the 
number of EU citizens from the new member states will outnumber the more traditional population 
of EU immigrants.20 Finally, the Panel D of Figure 1 shows the evolution of temporary (under 3 
years since migration) and more permanent EU immigrants (at least 3 years since migration). This 
plot reveals that both groups are growing at similar pace, and that the stock of temporary 
immigrants is more sensitive to the business cycle. To sum up, over the examined time span we see 
a very important increase in the number of EU immigrants in Denmark that change the EU 
immigration pattern towards an immigrant population which to a higher extent originates in the new 
member states and is more concentrated in first half of working age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
from old EU countries, and both groups are much more heavily concentrated than the population 
with Danish citizenship. As a consequence, the population of children and youth from new EU 
countries is also much more concentrated in the pre-school period than youth from old EU 
countries. In addition, there are very few age retired immigrants from new EU countries. 
20 Ultimo 2013, the five main states of origin for EU citizens in Denmark were Poland, Romania, 
Sweden, Germany and the UK. 
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Figure 1: Population of EU Citizens in Denmark, by Individual Characteristics  
A.EU Citizens in Denmark 
 
B.EU Citizens in Denmark By Age 
 
C. EU Citizens in Denmark By Country of Origin
 
D. EU Citizens in Denmark By Years Since Migration 
 
Notes: Panel A plots the number of residents in Denmark each 31st of December of the current year with citizenship 
from a member state of the European Union. Panel B plots the number of EU citizens in Denmark by age groups. Panel 
C plots the number of EU citizens with citizenship belonging to countries entering EU before May 2004 (solid line), 
and the number of EU citizens from countries that enter EU from May 2004 (dashed line). Finally, the panel D plots the 
number of EU citizens in Denmark for two subsamples according with their years since migration to Denmark. The 
solid line denotes the numbers of EU citizens who have been at least 3 years in Denmark, whereas the dashed line 
denotes EU citizens who have been under 3 years in Denmark.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the overall EU population in Denmark, by year of 
observation and by length of residence. The table shows that on average an EU citizen is about 35 
years old and has been 5.5 years in Denmark. However, the average age of EU citizens falls over 
the studied period from 38 in 2002 to 34 years old in 2013 due to the high presence of younger EU 
immigrants from the new member states. Despite the important increase in the number of EU 
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immigrants as well as the changes in age and country of origin, many characteristics of EU 
immigrants in Denmark have been stable. Residence length, presence of females, employment, 
hospitalization and criminal charges remain at very similar levels across 2002-2013. In fact, the 
percentages of main drivers of social expenditure such as unemployment insurance and social 
assistance are lower in 2013 than in 2002. When distinguishing EU citizens since years of residence 
in Denmark, we see that EU citizens with shorter term residence, i.e. at most three years in 
Denmark tend to be much younger, have less children and a smaller percentage of key social 
benefits such as study grant, unemployment insurance, social assistance, as well as being less 
frequent users of the health care sector than EU citizens with longer term residence, i.e. more than 
three years in Denmark. We thus see that ‘social integration’, denoting the extent to which the 
welfare system is used, is weaker for EU citizens with shorter term residence. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on EU Citizens in Denmark, 2002-2013 
 
All 2002 2013 
Under 3 
years since 
migration 
At least 3 
years since 
migration 
Percentage of citizens from Old EU (%) 69 100 54 53 77 
Average age 35 38 34 28 39 
Percentage aged 0-16 (%) 11 12 11 9 12 
Percentage aged 17-24 (%) 15 9 16 30 6 
Percentage aged 25-44 (%) 46 44 48 51 44 
Percentage aged 45-64 (%) 22 28 19 8 30 
Percentage aged at least 65 (%) 6 7 5 1 9 
Percentage females (%) 47 45 47 45 48 
Average number of children in the family 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.9 
Average years since migration 5.5 5.5 5.6 0.8 9.3 
Percentage with study support (%) 2 2 3 1 3 
Percentage employed (%) 68 66 68 63 72 
Percentage passive unemployed (%) 2 3 3 0.9 3 
Percentage other unemployed (%) 2 2 2 1 2 
Percentage with social assistance (%) 3 4 3 1 4 
Percentage visiting GP or specialists (%) 58  66 41 68 
Percentage hospitalization (%) 13 11 11 6 17 
Percentage with criminal charges (%) 3 3 3 2 4 
Average Fiscal Impact (€2013) 12777 13876 12378 6488 16259 
Average Contribution (€2013) 7388 7104 6698 2549 10067 
Average Expenditure (€2013) 5389 6772 5680 3939 6192 
Observations 1207098 53782 159857 430750 776348 
Notes: Percentage with study support denotes the fraction of EU citizens with study support for at least 6 months among 
citizens aged 16-64. Percentage employed denotes the fraction of EU citizens with positive wage earnings among citizens 
aged 16-64. Percentage passive unemployed is the fraction of EU citizens with unemployment insurance for at least 6 
months among citizens aged 16-64. Percentage other unemployed is the fraction of EU citizens with unemployment 
insurance under active labour market policy program, under sickness benefit, under parental leave or under job leave for at 
least 6 months among citizens aged 16-64. Percentage with social assistance is the fraction of EU citizens with social 
assistance for at least 6 months among citizens aged 16-64. Percentage with criminal charges is the fraction of EU citizens 
with at least one charge for offense among citizens aged 15 and beyond. Percentage visiting GP or specialists is the fraction 
of EU citizens with at least one visit to a GP or a specialised doctor among all EU citizens. Percentage hospitalization is the 
fraction of EU citizens with at least one visit to a hospital among all EU citizens. The fiscal impact and their components 
are expressed in EURO from 2013, denoted €2013. 
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The fiscal impact of EU citizens in Denmark during 2002-2013 
For the fiscal impact of EU citizens, we computed this by directly ascribing individuals their public 
transfer and estimated cost for each public service and their contribution to each of the revenue 
sources in the dataset. This allows us to calculate for each year overall net fiscal impact of the 100% 
of population of EU citizens registered in Denmark. The fiscal impact is attained by calculating the 
difference in contributions and expenditures (for similar methods, see Dustmann and Frattini 2014; 
Ruist 2014). Below figure 2 presents the contribution, expenditure and net fiscal impact for the full 
EU population each year 2002-2013, in aggregated and average figures.21 Our estimates show that 
over the entire period, immigrants from EU countries contribute with €15538 million to Danish 
welfare, expended €8905 million in public income transfer and services and therefore made a 
positive fiscal contribution to Denmark of €6633 million. As shown in Figure 2 Panel A, the 
aggregated contribution and expenditure increase substantially over time, driven by the fast grow in 
EU immigration to Denmark. The figure also shows that the total fiscal contribution has grown 
practically each year, with the only exception of period 2008-2010. 
Figure 2 Panel B, which reports the average figures, demonstrates that the upward trend in net fiscal 
impact is driven by EU population growth. During the studied period, the average fiscal impact has 
dropped somewhat when comparing 2002 with 2013. However apart from the years of crisis 2008-
2010, it is also remarkable that average fiscal impact remained pretty constant around €6000 per EU 
citizen. The 2004 enlargement slightly reduced individual contribution. Average expenditure 
increased temporarily during the worst years of economic downturn, but individual expenditure 
came back to pre-crisis levels in 2012-2013. To sum up, the fiscal contribution of EU citizens in 
Denmark improves steadily over time driven by very fast growing immigration population. EU 
                                                            
21 The tables in appendix A report the amount pr. year in €2013 for the full EU population and for 
the different groups considered in this paper. 
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citizens’ extended access to Danish welfare, enlargements and the onset of one of the most severe 
economic crises in Europe have had a limited and temporary impact on individual’s reception of 
public income transfers and consumption of public services. 
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Figure 2: The fiscal impact of EU citizens in Denmark 2002-2013 
A. Total Fiscal Impact, in Million €2013 
 
B. Average Fiscal Impact, in €2013 
 
C. Lower bound for Average Fiscal Impact, in €2013 
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The fiscal impact by components; age, years since migration and country of origin  
As discussed previously, the evolution of EU immigration to Denmark clearly shows a very fast 
increasing trend in the presence of EU citizens at the first half of their working age. Not 
surprisingly, figure 3 Panel A, which reports average fiscal impact by age groups, shows that the net 
fiscal impact of EU immigrants is driven by working age population of EU citizens. When we focus 
on children and youth groups, their average contribution is very stable across the period, with 
children costing about €5000 to the Danish welfare state and the youth group (17-24) practically 
having no fiscal impact due to the presence of both students and workers on their first years on the 
labour market. A very different picture arises for the group of age retired EU citizens. In this case, 
their negative fiscal impact drops between 2007 and 2011 and returns to pre-2007 levels in 2012-
2013. The differences in the fiscal impact across age groups show the importance of the age 
distribution of a population. EU citizens in Denmark are, however, overrepresented in the age 
groups, which make a positive fiscal impact. 
We now turn our focus on the different contribution of temporary, e.g. immigrants with residence 
under 3 years, and those with longer residence in Denmark, e.g. more than three years of residence.  
Figure 3 demonstrates that both groups of EU citizens have a positive contribution to Danish 
welfare. However, the contribution of EU citizens with shorter term residence in Denmark is on 
average €4000 lower than that of immigrants with more years in Denmark. Nevertheless, the 
consumption of public income and services of more recently arrived EU citizens is also much 
lower.  
When comparing citizens from old versus new member states, figure 3 shows that citizens from old 
member states contribute more but also benefit more, i.e. social expenditures are higher. The 
aggregated fiscal impact from the two groups of countries are positive for both throughout the 
examined period but as shown by Dustmann and Frattini as well as Ruist (Dustmann and Frattini 
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2014; Ruist 2014), the net fiscal contribution is higher from EU citizens from old member states 
than from new member states. The fiscal impact from EU citizens from the new member states 
increases considerably from the EU10 enlargement in 2004 to 2008, then drops 2008-2010. From 
2011-2013 we see a more modest increase again. The evolution is different for citizens from the old 
member states. We see a decrease in the net fiscal contribution onto 2010, followed by an increase 
2011-2013.  
Figure 3 reveals the different contribution of several subpopulations of interest. Obviously, it is 
difficult to identify the separate role of individual characteristics, as we do not have access to 
natural experimental data. However, we go a bit further in an attempt to disentangle the role of 
individual heterogeneity on fiscal contribution, and we assess the strength of association of key 
socio-economic characteristics of EU immigrants given we control for time effects. Columns 1 to 3 
of Table 2 display the results of regressing the individual fiscal impact, contribution and 
expenditure on year dummies (time dummy for 2013 excluded), age, gender, country of origin, 
years since migration, income, criminality, health, social assistance and study support. These results 
(columns 1-3 of Table 2) thus account for time variation and individual heterogeneity in fiscal 
contribution. These estimations, therefore, represent the hypothetical differences between similar 
EU immigrants in included covariates who depart in particular characteristics. The estimated results 
show that fiscal contribution increases with age at a decreasing pace, because public expenditure 
decreases, and therefore suggest that the lack of difference in average fiscal impact between age 
groups 25-44 and 45-64 is due to differences between these two groups which compensate for the 
influence of age. Females with similar observable characteristics tend to contribute and expend 
more than males but due to their much higher public expenditure, their average fiscal impact is 
lower than that of males. Citizens from old EU countries contribute on average €1330 more than 
citizens from new EU countries due to their higher contribution. Interestingly, the longer EU 
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citizens stay in Denmark, the lower their contribution, a result that is in apparent contradiction with 
the results presented in Figure 3. We turn back to this result with an analysis of out-migration. In 
addition, the estimations of Table 2 show that the average fiscal impact is determined in a higher 
extent by income due to its central role in direct and indirect taxation, but income has a relatively 
much minor influence on public expenditure. The last rows of Table 2 reflect the negative impact 
on fiscal contribution of health problems, criminal charges, social assistance and study support 
claimants.  
The last column in Table 2 displays the estimated probability to leave Denmark, e.g. outmigration, 
as a function of time dummies and the characteristics of individuals including contribution and 
expenditure measured in the preceding year.22 This regression improves the understanding of the 
role of years in Denmark on fiscal impact. Obviously, the longer the individual stays in Denmark 
the higher the cumulated contribution of the individual to Denmark. However, as shown in columns 
1-3 of the table, lengthy residence in Denmark tends to both reduce contribution and increase public 
expenditure, this apparently revealing the presence of the second mechanism of welfare magnet 
hypothesis. However, the first two rows of column 4 of Table 2 strongly suggest that the negative 
relation between residence length and fiscal contribution is mainly driven by much stronger tax 
repulsion than benefit-attraction effect on EU citizens’ out-migration behaviour. Thus, EU 
immigrants who pay more tax will leave to a greater extent than EU migrants who receive fewer 
benefits, and this selective out-migration contributes to the negative relation between net fiscal 
impact and length of residence in Denmark, as those who decide not to leave the country pay 
potentially lower taxes than those who decide to leave. 
 
                                                            
22 This regression excludes 2002 from the sample as we do not have individual information for year 
2001. 
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Figure 3: The average fiscal impact of EU citizens in Denmark 2002-2013 by age, years since 
residence and country of origin, in €2013 
A.Fiscal Impact By Age 
  
B.Fiscal Impact By Years Since Migration  
 
C.Fiscal Impact Components By Years Since Migration 
 
D.Fiscal Impact By Country Of Origin 
 
E.Fiscal Impact Components By Country Of Origin 
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Table 2: Dependency of Fiscal Impact, Contribution, Expenditure and Outmigration on 
characteristics of EU citizens 
 Dependent Variable 
 Fiscal Impact Contribution Expenditure Outmigration 
(%) Contribution (€1000)     0.14*** 
Expenditure (€1000)    -0.00 
Year 2002 -1092*** -1322*** -229**  
Year 2003 -1296*** -1295*** 2 -0.25 
Year 2004 -1441*** -1469*** -28 -0.44 
Year 2005 -1009*** -1239*** -230*** -2.86*** 
Year 2006 -1389*** -1216*** 173 -3.72*** 
Year 2007 -1222*** -1225*** -2 -2.56*** 
Year 2008 -1219*** -1183*** 36 0.31 
Year 2009 -1166*** -999*** 167** -2.88*** 
Year 2010 -1262*** -824*** 438*** -2.87*** 
Year 2011 -868*** -680*** 188*** -3.95*** 
Year 2012 -411*** -361*** 50 -3.98*** 
Age 281*** -54 -334*** -0.31*** 
Age2 -4*** 0 5*** 0.00*** 
Female -332 721** 1053*** -1.23*** 
Citizen from Old EU 1528*** 1149*** -379*** -2.41*** 
Years Since Migration -508*** 14 522*** 0.08*** 
Years Since Migration2 12*** -0 -12*** -0.00*** 
Income (€1000) 546*** 535*** -10*** -0.08 
Charged -7336*** -43** 7293*** -2.41*** 
Hospitalization -20147*** -301*** 19847*** -3.44*** 
Social Assistance -10972*** -207 10765*** -4.53*** 
Study Support -4872*** -344 4528*** -0.31*** 
Observations 925829 925829 925829 790468 
Notes: Column entitled ‘Fiscal Impact’ reports OLS regression estimates of fiscal impact measured in €2013 on 
individual characteristics. Column entitled ‘Contribution’ reports OLS regression estimates of contribution of EU 
citizens measured in €2013 on their individual characteristics. Column entitled ‘Expenditure’ reports OLS 
regression estimates of expenditure on EU citizens measured in €2013 on their individual characteristics. Finally, 
the column entitled ‘Outmigration (%)’ is a regression of the percentage of EU citizens who out-migrate on 
individual characteristics. Note that contribution and expenditure are measured in 1000 €2013 in the out-migration 
regression. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. * denotes statistically significant at 
5%, ** denotes statistically significant at 1%, and *** denotes statistically significant at 0.1%. 
 
Conclusion 
The sustainability of the welfare state in a Union where citizens can reside freely is increasingly 
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contested. The nexus between the welfare state and EU immigration became high politics in the UK 
referendum and has cast the EU into its worst crisis ever. Also beyond the European Union, the welfare-
immigration unsustainability thesis stands strong and appears largely undisputed. The current re-
articulation of the thesis calls for an empirical test which has been the research endeavor of this paper.  
 
In this paper, we have examined the fiscal impact of EU immigration on the universalistic, tax-financed 
welfare state of Denmark. In the exceptional system of EU free movement for persons and cross border 
welfare, Denmark constitutes a crucial case with the largest share of non-contributory social benefits 
among other key characteristics. According to the theoretical claims of both the unsustainability thesis 
and that of welfare magnetism, the Danish welfare state should be particularly vulnerable in the EU 
setting, because immigrants will be attracted by generous and inclusive welfare provisions and will tend 
to stay in such institutional setting. Welfare attraction will place a heavy fiscal burden on the welfare 
budget as immigrants will be entitled to benefits without being obliged to contribute.   
 
The main contribution of this paper has been an empirical inquiry into a solid theoretical claim – on the 
basis of a unique dataset, a long time span and for a 100% of EU citizens residing in Denmark. The main 
conclusion is that even in this type of exposed welfare state – and even during a time span of considerable 
structural changes – EU immigrants made a significant positive net contribution to the Danish welfare 
state. Not only have EU citizens paid their way through the welfare system but they have also made a 
considerable contribution to its fiscal sustainability through tax payment. The unsustainability thesis 
disregard that inclusive, generous welfare states also oblige its residents to high tax payments. Also 
disregarded is that EU rules permit member states to condition residence rights on EU immigrants not 
being a ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social system of a hosting state.  
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During the twelve years timespan examined, the EU immigration pattern in Denmark changed 
substantively – but reliance on welfare remained rather stable. EU citizens residing in DK increased with 
approximately 146% and the EU immigrant population became increasingly from the new member states 
and more concentrated in the first half of working age. However, the average fiscal impact of EU citizens 
remained positive – even during the economic downturns of 2008-2010. Contributions decreased during 
the crisis years and expenditures went up, but stayed positive on a net balance - also when taking average 
cost of public goods into account. The differences in the fiscal impact across age groups showed the 
importance of the age distribution of a population. EU citizens in Denmark are, however, overrepresented 
in the age groups, which make a positive fiscal impact. EU citizens with shorter term residence proved to 
contribute less but also benefit less from the welfare state than those with longer term residence. 
Moreover, our study compared the fiscal impact of EU citizens from old member states with citizens from 
the new member states. The net contribution from citizens from new member states was positive since 
their Union membership and onwards but slightly lower than citizens from old member states. The latter 
group makes higher contributions due to higher earnings but also benefits more from the welfare state 
than citizens from the new member states. Finally, examining the likelihood of out-migration of EU 
citizens in Denmark on the basis of individual socio-economic characteristics, we identified a tax 
repulsion mechanism rather than a welfare benefit attraction effect. The results on outmigration suggest 
that the negative relation between residence length and fiscal contribution, i.e. tax payment, is mainly 
driven by much stronger tax repulsion than benefit-attraction effect on EU citizens’ out-migration 
behaviour. EU immigrants who pay more tax tend to leave to a higher extent than EU migrants who 
receive fewer benefits.  
 
Our findings challenge the conventional theoretical assumption – and currently politically articulated 
concern - that welfare sustainability relies on a strong element of closure. At least the universalistic, tax-
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based welfare budget of Denmark has benefitted considerably from EU immigration through a period of 
paramount political and economic change. Our findings did not support the three key claims of the 
welfare unsustainability thesis. Between 2002 and 2013 1) EU free movement rules did not prove 
unsustainable in the more inclusive and generous welfare state examined. 2) Despite the grand 
enlargements within the period, the fiscal impact remained positive – also when examined for different 
components of the immigrating population; age, years since migration and country of origin. 3) 
Immigrants with short-term residence proved to contribute less to the welfare budget but also benefit less 
here from. Also this group of EU citizens proved to pay their way into the Danish welfare state. These 
findings strongly suggest that welfare states are more resilient to open borders than theoretical and 
political claims articulate.  
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Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Fiscal impact of EU citizens in Denmark by age, country of origin and years since migration, on average per individual, in euro 
Year All Age 0-16 Age 17-24 Age 25-44 Age 45-64 Age 65- Old EU New EU 
Under 3 
YSM 
At Least 3 
YSM 
2002 7827 -5027 -797 12214 12948 -8503 7827  5862 10423 
2003 7282 -5210 -1128 11710 12016 -8382 7282  5084 9927 
2004 6057 -5431 -719 10065 10755 -8279 6815 1942 3306 8662 
2005 6361 -5680 -579 10579 11416 -8531 7104 2850 3532 9549 
2006 6011 -5725 -163 10243 10894 -9601 6650 3552 3955 9243 
2007 5739 -6171 410 10022 10556 -12038 6265 4316 4357 9527 
2008 5652 -6278 985 10223 9981 -14655 6066 4798 5324 9059 
2009 4833 -6358 88 9644 9201 -16594 5294 3986 4399 8202 
2010 3967 -6919 -652 8667 8990 -19353 4429 3213 3349 7492 
2011 4120 -6741 -963 8662 9949 -18835 4769 3182 3042 7577 
2012 5643 -6308 -527 9444 13180 -11107 7086 3766 3572 9200 
2013 5680 -6440 -475 9290 13737 -11605 7302 3765 3847 9186 
2002-13 5764 -6024 -377 10063 11135 -12290 6407 3537 4136 9004 
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Table A2: Contribution and expenditure by country of origin and years since migration, on average per individual, in euro 
 Contribution Expenditure 
Year All 
Under 3 
YSM 
At Least 3 
YSM 
Old EU New EU All 
Under 3 
YSM 
At Least 3 
YSM 
Old EU New EU 
2002 14934 8189 16958 14934  7107 2328 6535 7107  
2003 14764 7592 16860 14764  7482 2508 6933 7482  
2004 13576 5558 16238 14438 8886 7518 2253 7576 7624 6944 
2005 13651 5679 16939 14610 9125 7290 2147 7390 7505 6275 
2006 13385 5967 17443 14546 8914 7373 2012 8200 7896 5362 
2007 13388 6457 18152 14895 9306 7649 2100 8625 8630 4990 
2008 13042 7559 17775 14902 9198 7390 2235 8716 8836 4400 
2009 12565 7386 17190 14469 9068 7732 2987 8988 9175 5082 
2010 12222 6566 16817 14350 8750 8254 3216 9326 9920 5536 
2011 12058 5916 16396 14349 8751 7938 2873 8819 9580 5569 
2012 12079 6020 16402 14537 8880 6436 2448 7202 7451 5114 
2013 12378 6346 16708 15024 9254 6698 2499 7523 7722 5489 
2002-13 13170 6603 16990 14651 9013 7406 2467 7986 8244 5476 
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Figure A1. Age distributions of EU citizens in Denmark, by citizenship 
 
 
 
Notes: The histograms reported in both panels are constructed on the basis of age 
distribution among population of EU citizens from both groups of countries 
during the period 2009-2013. 
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Online Appendix:  Estimations of welfare service costs in Denmark 2002-2013.  A Note on 
Data Collection 
This note describes the procedures for data collection, including the calculation of the costs per unit 
of providing a given service within the public service sectors in Denmark; hospitalization, 
enrolment in day care, elementary school, secondary education, studying at an institution of higher 
education, as well as a consultation with a general practitioner, consultation with a dentist as well as 
the cost assessed for crime. In order to analyse a complete time series, estimates are extrapolated 
from the existing data through a simple linear extrapolation. As shown in Figure B1 the available 
data shows a general linear tendency. This way, linear extrapolation seems feasible. 
Hospitalization: 
Data on the total hospital expenditures has been extracted from Statistics Denmark’s public 
expenditures section, and covers the period from 2007-2013. The data can be found on the 
webpage, http://www.statistikbanken.dk/ESSPROS1, by following the path: ‘1.2 Sygehusvæsenet’ 
>> ‘Sociale Udgifter I Alt’. Data on number of hospitalizations  is retrieved 
from http://www.statistikbanken.dk/IND03. The cost per unit estimate is the total expenditures  
divided by the number of hospitalizations. The same procedure is followed in Jacobsen, Junge and 
Skaksen (Jacobsen et al. 2011, 23). 
Day Care Enrolment:  
The cost per unit estimates of having a child enrolled in day care (i.e. cover crèche, family day care, 
nursery schools and age-integrated institutions) per year rely on the official estimates developed by 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior. The estimates can be retrieved 
at http://www.noegletal.dk/, by selecting ‘Alle kommuner’ >> ’Dagtilbud’ – udgifter og tilskud’ >> 
’Udg. (brutto) til dagtilbud pr. 0-13-årige’.  
Elementary School Enrolment: 
The cost per unit estimates per pupil enrolled in elementary school per year rely on the official 
estimates developed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior. The estimates represent the 
sum of the cost pr. 6-16 year old of attending public or private elementary school. These estimates 
can be retrieved at http://www.noegletal.dk/, by selecting ‘Alle kommuner’ >> ‘Undervisning’ >> 
’Udg. til folkeskolen pr. 6-16-årig’ // ‘Udg. til privatskoler, efterskoler m.fl. pr. 6-16-årig’.  
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Secondary Education Enrolment: 
The cost per secondary education enrolment per year is proxied by the rate the state pays to each 
secondary educational institution per full-time equivalent (FTE) (i.e. ‘Taxametertakst’). The data is 
retrieved from the Ministry for Children, Education and Gender Equality 
at http://www.uvm.dk/Administration/Takstkatalog-og-finanslov/Takstkatalog/Tidligere-
takstkataloger. The estimates are an average across vocational schools, general upper secondary 
schools, and vocational colleges. Data is available from 2007 onwards. 
General Practitioner: 
The yearly total public expenditures to general practitioners have been extracted from the financial 
statement of the Regions and cover the years 2007-2013.  The excel spreadsheet can be found 
at http://www.regioner.dk/aftaler-og-oekonomi/udgifter-og-finansiering/regnskab. The estimates are 
found under the header 'praksissektor eksl. medicin'. The number of consultations per year is 
retrieved from Statistics Denmark, at http://www.dst.dk/da/statistik/nyt/relateret?pid=1316, ID: 
SYGK, and covers the same period. The cost per unit is calculated by dividing total expenditures by 
the total number of consultations. 
Dentist: 
Data on the total expenditures to dentistry specifically is extracted from Statistics Denmark’s data 
base, at http://www.statistikbanken.dk/SYGUS, by selecting ‘Tandplejer – før 2007 
histopatologiske undersøgelser’ and ‘Tandlægehjælp’ under ‘Ydelsesarter’. Data covers the period 
2006-2013. The data on consultations are likewise found in Statistics Denmark’s data base, 
at http://www.dst.dk/da/statistik/nyt/relateret?pid=1316, ID: SYGK, by selecting ‘Tandlæge and 
Tandplejer’ under ‘Ydelsesarter’. The cost per unit is calculated by dividing total expenditures by 
the total number of consultations. The data is available from 2006 onwards. 
Higher Education: 
Data on the cost per unit for higher education is proxied by the rate the state pays to each higher 
education institution per FTE (i.e. ‘Taxametertakst’). The data is available at the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Sciences’ webpage: http://ufm.dk/en/education-and-institutions/higher-
education/danish-universities/the-universities-in-denmark/economics-of-university-
sector?set_language=en&cl=en. The estimates represent an average over the rates of university 
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students, thus leaving out short term and medium term higher education due to data shortages. 
However, a comparison of the university estimates with the estimates of short- and medium term 
higher educations for the available years 2012 and 2013 (retrieved from http://ufm.dk/uddannelse-
og-institutioner/videregaende-uddannelse/erhvervsakademier/okonomi/tilskud) indicates that the 
estimates represent the total higher education system well. 
Crime: 
For the unit cost of criminal charges, we base our estimates on the 2009-estimate in Jacobsen, 
Junge, and Skaksen (Jacobsen et al. 2011, 23). The 2009-estimate is used for the whole period 
under investigation. Their cost per unit of crime is estimated to be 49.500 DKK, i.e. 6653 Euro per 
criminal ruling. Register data provides us with information on the number of charges, the cost of 
which we approximate by the cost per unit of a criminal ruling. Our estimates are thus expected to 
be upper-bound estimates compared to the actual expenditure. 
 
Table B1: Final Estimates 
             
Cost per Unit 
(FTEs, €) 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Elementary School 6.695 6.937 7.182 7.399 7.673 7.819 8.188 8.673 8.700 8.516 8.609 8.532 
Day Care 4.834 4.966 5.123 5.285 5.466 5.593 5.789 6.213 6.428 6.306 6.364 6.377 
Hospitalization 1.598 1.672 1.747 1.821 2.268 1.703 1.860 2.064 2.205 2.292 2.390 2.465 
Upper Secondary  9.652 9.829 10.006 10.183 10.360 11.129 9.920 10.698 11.486 11.171 11.507 11.566 
Higher education 8.866 8.760 7.751 11.480 8.669 8.250 8.616 9.022 9.280 9.273 9.291 9.122 
Dentist 34 36 37 39 39 40 42 49 50 50 52 45 
GP 27 28 28 29 30 30 31 32 33 33 33 34 
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Figure B1: Linear Extrapolation 
 
 
 
